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The political discourse on demographic change has gained momentum in many developed countries. 
When it began, the discussion centred on the question of how to influence population ageing through 
political means (e.g., by raising fertility rates). But political decision makers now seem to be concerned 
about the consequences of demographic change on societal dynamics, especially intergenerational 
relations. 
This is particularly evident in Germany, where the latest pension increase provoked a 
discussion about a possible transformation of the political system into a “gerontocracy”, in which the 
elderly control public resources to their own benefit. In this paper, we investigate whether there is 
evidence for such a scenario by looking at two main questions. First, what is the effect of age on 
preferences toward social policies, which organise public transfers between generations (family and 
pension policies)? Second, to what extent does a possible age effect depend on further demographic 
factors, such as parenthood and marriage, which represent the framework of an individual’s life 
course? 
In order to answer these questions, we use recent survey data (GGS 2005 and PPAS 2003), 
which we analyse by applying standard linear models as well as Generalised Additive Models. The latter 
allow us to identify the trajectories of a possible age effect and its dependency on other demographic 
variables. 
In contrast to most existing studies, our analyses show clear age effects: older people are less 
prone to support a variety of transfers to families than younger respondents. At the same time, the 
elderly are more prone to support pension policy reforms that put an even greater burden on the 
younger generation. We can also show that the age effects found are not always linear and follow 
different trajectories across the life course. We therefore argue that classical economic concepts cannot 
fully explain age-based support for intergenerational transfers. Age effects have to be seen in light of 














  2I Introduction 
Over the past decade, the discourse on demographic change has gained momentum in many 
developed countries, especially in Europe. When it began the discussion centred around the 
question of how to influence population ageing using political means, e.g., by raising fertility 
levels or allowing for higher levels of immigration. Now, however, political decision makers 
seem to be more concerned about the consequences that demographic trends may have on 
societal dynamics, especially intergenerational relations. This is particularly evident in 
Germany, where the latest pension increase has provoked a discussion about whether the 
country is about to become a “gerontocracy,” i.e.,  a system in which political power is 
concentrated in the hands of the elderly, as this group represents an increasing share of the 
electorate due to population ageing. A further basic assumption of this scenario is that the 
elderly use their (implicit and explicit) political power to control public resources in their own 
interests, and in opposition to the needs of the young. 
On the other hand, the elderly also seem to be under increasing societal and political 
pressure: retirees are being held responsible for the current financial problems of the social 
security system, as well as the future debts of the younger generation. As a consequence, there 
have been a range of political reforms which aim at cutting costs stemming from transfers to 
the older generation. For example, taxation on pensions was increased in 2004, and in early 
2009 the German Bundestag passed the so-called debt brake bill (“Schuldenbremse”), which limits 
the annual national debt to 0.35 percent of German GDP as of 2016, and which was clearly 
motivated by a group of younger MPs arguing for more intergenerational justice. At the same 
time, and as in many other European countries, more money has been spent on children and 
families. There are two main reasons for this shift in policy direction. First, the German 
Constitutional Court pointed out in several of its decisions that families had been 
economically disadvantaged. Second, a new family policy paradigm called “Sustainable Family 
Policy” (Gruescu and Rürup 2003) was introduced, and established as the “meta-aim” of 
German family policies an increase in birth rates. This increase is to be achieved through the 
implementation of an array of reforms, e.g., better childcare facilities or new parental leave 
benefits. The latter was introduced in 2007, and has resulted in additional costs of about € 4 
billion per year. 
 Indications of an emerging generational conflict are also reflected in the current media 
discourse. The leading German dailies are printing headlines such as: “Greedy pensioners – 
future generations have to pay the bill,” “Child-care ban: How child-unfriendly is Hamburg?” 
or “No hip-replacements for the very old.” 
This discussion of a conflict between the young and the old over public resources is 
fairly new in the German context; internationally it was first broached by Samuel Preston as 
early as in 1984. Preston analysed the situation in the United States, and his observation that a 
growing share of older people leads to higher spending for the elderly, and, subsequently, to 
lower public transfers to children, has been a subject of controversy ever since. Most of the 
existing research in demography, sociology and political science has so far rejected the concept 
of generational conflict, often focusing instead on still functioning generational relations 
within the family. However, this optimistic conclusion might be challenged, especially in the 
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the need for reform of old age social security posed by population ageing, and the weakening 
of traditional family structures with more childless and unmarried people in the future. The 
very few recent studies on the issue have found either no effects of population ageing on 
redistributive public spending on the macro level (Tepe and Vanhuysse 2007), or limited 
evidence of age differences in related preferences on the individual level, especially in the 
German context (Busemeyer et al. 2009). All these studies use cross-country datasets, which 
have limitations regarding questionnaires and sample size when looking at specific countries. 
Furthermore, they focus solely on pension and education policies as proxies for upward and 
downward transfers, and do not take family policies into account. They also base their 
analytical framework on classical political economy concepts, which conceptualise age in light 
of economic life cycle phases (education, labour market participation, retirement). We argue 
that adding a demographic perspective to these models contributes to an understanding of age 
differences that tends to support intergenerational transfers, as the underlying motives for 
social policy preferences are determined not only by an individual’s location within the 
economic life cycle, but also within the demographic life course (marriage, parenthood, 
grandparenthood). 
In an earlier study (Wilkoszewski 2008) based on data from the 2003 wave of the 
Population and Policy Acceptance Survey (PPAS), we have already shown that large age 
effects can be found for the German case when looking at preferences for monetary family 
policies (e.g., an increase in child benefits), and that childlessness plays a significant role in 
determining these preferences as well. In the paper at hand, we intend to extend this analysis 
by several dimensions to shed more light on how demography affects public transfer 
preferences. First, we incorporate a set of 12 additional family policy measures into our study, 
which represent all possible public downward transfer types (i.e., money, time, care, housing). 
Second, our findings for downward transfers are contrasted by adding a proxy for upward 
transfers: we analyse preferences for pension policy reforms. Third, additional statistical 
models are applied in order to identify the trajectories of the age effects found over the life 
course, as well as their dependency on demographic events. Finally, we apply our statistical 
models to a second large international survey (Generation and Gender Survey GGS, 2005) in 
order to test the robustness of our findings. 
The paper is structured as follows. We first present the current state of research in the 
field, and then derive our theoretical framework. Here, we extend in an ad hoc manner the 
usual political economy concepts used for the research question at hand. Special attention is 
paid to the role of underlying motives for policy preferences. The third part of the paper 
introduces the research design including the datasets used, as well as the statistical techniques 
applied. Part 4 presents the findings of our empirical analysis. The paper ends with a short 





  4II Literature overview and theoretical considerations 
 
1 Research on demographic change, intergenerational relations and preferences 
The question of demographic change and intergenerational transfers has been addressed 
mainly by economists seeking to measure the extent and direction of transfers between 
generations, as well as by sociologists and psychologists analysing the underlying motives 
behind transfers. The latter two, however, have focused on private intergenerational transfers, 
rather than on public ones. Only a few studies have analysed possible age effects in this 
context, even though from a theoretical point of view age is crucial to preference patterns: the 
(political and social) interests of different groups in the modern welfare state largely depend 
on rights and duties which are based on chronological age. Such an age-based system of access 
to and restriction of benefits can only be sustained as long as its character as a contract 
between age groups remains credible, i.e., every age group is treated in the same way as its 
respective counterpart in the past or in the future. However, demographic change poses major 
challenges to all modern welfare states. Unequal treatment for different age groups is   
therefore already moving up on the agenda, and may be expected to gain importance in the 
future. 
Generally, existing studies come to the conclusion that family transfers exist to a 
significant extent, and flow mostly from the elderly to the younger generations (e.g., 
McGarry/Schoeni 1997), whereas public transfers are directed upwards (Lee 2003). However, 
recent generational accounting studies have tended to support the hypothesis that, in the case 
of the U.S., the net present value over the life cycle for current younger generations is positive 
(e.g., Bommier et al. 2004). According to Schokkaert, one of the most remarkable findings in 
the empirical work on the magnitude of transfers is the significant effect of age and education 
on voluntary work and charitable giving: highly educated older people give more of their 
resources than the less educated and younger members of society (Schokkaert 2006). 
 
1.1 Preferences toward intergenerational transfers 
The ongoing pension policy debate in Germany provides an apt illustration of why motives or 
preferences – in this case, public acceptance of the so-called generational contract – are 
crucial, not only for families, but also for public transfer flows between the generations. As 
long as members of the working-age generation perceive contributions to the pension system 
as insurance rates, and not as taxes, it seems plausible that workers will be more willing to 
make these contributions to the elderly. On the other hand, a perception that pension 
contributions represent pure taxation can lead to welfare losses due to lower support for these 
transfers, e.g., in the form of an increase of activities in the shadow economy (Börsch-
Supan/Reil-Held 2001). Surveys show that when the current German pension system was 
started in the early 1960s, most workers considered pension contribution rates to be fair, 
whereas now the majority see pension benefits as transfers to the generation of the elderly 
which are only linked loosely to own contributions (Boeri et al. 2001). 
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studies dealing with the analysis of attitudes focus on private intergenerational transfers in 
specific social interactions in the family context (e.g., Cox and Soldo 2004). Far less research 
has been devoted to the analysis of preferences towards public intergenerational transfers. 
This is partly due to the fact that the necessary survey data are available only to a limited 
extent. 
A comprehensive overview of studies on attitudes towards public intergenerational 
transfers is provided by Kohli (Kohli 2005). Two data sources focusing on international 
comparisons were used in these studies (Andreß/Heien 2001, Blekesaune/Quadagno 2003, 
Hicks 2001, Smith 2000, European Commission 2004, Kohl 2003): (a) the International Social 
Survey Program (ISSP), a rather extensive (in terms of sample size) yearly survey with 
additional topical modules at larger intervals; and (b) the Eurobarometer, a regular survey of 
the European Union covering all member and candidate countries, but with smaller sample 
sizes than the ISSP, which makes the analysis of preferences according to age groups difficult, 
if not impossible. 
Concerning attitudes towards transfers (regardless of, for example, the effect of age), all 
recent studies basically offer the same findings: Hicks’ analysis (Hicks 2001), which is based on 
ISSP data, showed that the majority of people in all countries oppose reductions in old age 
benefits. Furthermore, when asked if government spending on pensions should be increased 
“more” or “much more,” even at the cost of a general tax increase, a considerable fraction of 
the analysed populations were found to agree with this policy option. In Germany, 13.5 
percent of the population opt for “much more,” and another a third for “more” public 
spending for the elderly, while only 3.9 percent support “lower,” and 0.4 percent “much 
lower” expenditures. With regard to the responsibility for the provision of pensions, the study 
finds high support in all countries for the proposition that the state should be responsible for 
the income of the elderly. In Germany, this view even gained support during the last decade of 
the 20th century (38 percent in 1992, 40 percent in 1999). 
Further findings on these issues are provided by a special Eurobarometer poll 
conducted in late 2001 covering public attitudes to the welfare state’s tasks, such as a 
guaranteed minimum pension or the pay-as-you-go system. Both of these were shown to have 
the support of a large majority of citizens throughout the EU, with very few differences seen 
between countries (European Commission 2004).  
The drawbacks of these studies include the data they are based on, which were collected 
during the 1980s and 1990s when demographic change had not yet played a significant role on 
political agendas, and the fact that the statistical techniques they apply mostly remain on the 
descriptive level. In addition, most of these studies do not look at downward transfers, and if 
they do so, they only consider transfers in the form of education policies (Smith 2000). 
Meanwhile, family policies are not considered, mostly because of data restrictions. These 
studies therefore fail to resolve the question of whether there are differences in preferences 
regarding the two directions of the public transfers. As people obviously tend to perceive the 
state as being the most responsible actor for social care (see above), it is plausible that the 
majority might support transfers to all age groups, regardless of the cost. 
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government expenditure on different policy fields (e.g., elderly, police, education, health), 
using ISSP data from 1985, 1990 and 1996 (Smith 2000). The main results of this study are 
that, on average, an increase in public spending for the health care sector is favoured over 
increased retirement benefits, which in turn ranks above all other government sectors. 
However, relatively large country-specific differences can be observed. For example, (West) 
German respondents in 1985 and 1990 were found to overwhelmingly favour increases in 
expenditures for environmental protection (81.1 percent in 1985 and 89.5 percent in 1990), 
even at the cost of higher taxes. While this study points in the right direction, its results remain 
at a limited explanatory level, because the government sectors which were included in the 
ISSP modules could not be directly connected to the interests of either the younger or the 
older generation. The one exception is education, which unfortunately was not analysed in 
Smith’s study with regard to differences in age groups. This gap in adequate data also persists 
in very recent studies of international surveys. A Eurobarometer on the solidarity between 
generations (European Commission 2009) again focuses solely on upward transfers in the 
form of pensions and old age care facilities. 
 
1.2 Socio-demographic influence on preferences: Does age matter? 
Whether or not age has an influence on attitudes toward public intergenerational transfers 
remains a controversial issue in the recent literature. Following Blekesaune and Quadagno’s 
and Hicks’ argument (Blekesaune/Quadagno 2003, Hicks 2001), Kohli draws the conclusion 
that “most attitude studies up to now show a level of acceptance of welfare policies that is 
much higher than the discourse on generational equity would lead us to think, with pensions 
being the most popular part of the welfare state. There is some differentiation along the age 
dimension, but much less than one would expect from an interest-based model of political 
preference” (Kohli 2005: p. 19). 
On the basis of Eurobarometer data, Kohl also argues that differences in attitudes 
between age groups concerning the needs for social protection at old age are relatively small, 
even though he identifies indications of weaker support for the idea of intergenerational 
solidarity among younger people (Kohl 2003). 
In contrast, Smith, analysing ISSP data, finds systematic differences in support of 
governmental spending on pensions: “Across age groups the predominant pattern was for 
support for governmental spending for retirement benefits to rise with age […]. This occurred 
in 19 of 25 countries. The generational differences were often quite large.” (Smith 2000: p. 
12). Similar findings are presented in a very recent study by Busemeyer et al. (2009) using the 
1996 wave of the ISSP, which looks at age/retirement and income effects on preferences 
toward education, health, and pension spending. Variation across countries and policy fields is 
considerable, with Germany (West) showing the smallest age differences. In their analytical 
concept, Busemeyer et al. frame age in an economic life cycle perspective; their framework 
does not consider further demographic variables, such as parenthood or marital status. 
The only existing research work which extends the analysis to a broader demographic 
perspective are the studies by Logan and Spitze (1995), Miettinen et al. (2008), and 
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to 80+ in 10-year intervals on a series of preferences toward parent-child relations and 
governmental programs for older people. Programs within the family sector are not taken into 
account. The data used in this study come from interviews with 1,200 residents of the Albany-
Schenectady-Troy metropolitan area, a region in the U.S. state of New York. Logan and Spitze 
conclude from their analysis that older people’s attitudes in both spheres are least likely to 
appear selfish, i.e., representing the “pro-elderly” position, if other variables are controlled for. 
The number of children seems to have an effect, though: “People with more adult children are 
more likely to adopt attitudes favouring the younger generation.” Using recent survey data, 
Wilkoszewski, however, finds large effects of both age and parenthood on preferences toward 
family policies for the German case: older and childless people are less prone to support 
increases in child benefits. 
 
1.3 Summary 
In summary, we find that existing research remains inconclusive on the question of whether 
age has an effect on social policy preferences. The large bulk of studies is based on cross-
country comparisons; some of these find certain evidence for age differences in degrees of 
support for intergenerational transfers, but with large variations across countries, and with 
small, if any, effects for Germany. Except for one study, the focus lies on education and 
pension policies as proxies for downward and upward transfers. Surprisingly, family policies, 
which cover various dimensions of redistributive policies to the younger generation (e.g., 
money, time, care, housing) are hardly considered, even though latest research has shown that 
large age differences can be found in related preferences. 
 
 
2 Theoretical considerations 
As far as the theoretical framework is concerned, the standard political economy approach to 
studying preferences on redistributive policies is based on concepts in which age as an 
explanatory demographic variable does not play a central role. Preferences for 
intergenerational transfers are rather explained by the individual’s position in economic terms, 
i.e., by his or her income and/or need for public transfers. Busemeyer et al. (2009) in their 
study extend this concept and assign age a more relevant function. They conceptualise age 
along different life cycle phases (i.e., education, labour market participation, retirement) and 
identify seven respective functional age groups, including “young and in education,” “young 
and in the labour market” and “old and in retirement.” The authors concede that age might 
bear more (demographic) explanatory power than just structuring economically (in-) active 
phases: 
 
“Given that education is focused on the young, it is to be expected that 
older people are less in favour of increases in education spending than 
younger people, controlling for their socio-economic status. Of course, 
older people will show a certain amount of support for education 
spending, either because they have (grand)children in education or 
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being.” (Busemeyer et al. 2009: p 199) 
 
Yet, their main measure of age differences in preferences is the comparison between 
individuals participating in the labour market (“middle-aged and in work”) and those out of 
the labour market (“old and retired”). Furthermore, Busemeyer’s et al. concept basically 
remains within a rational-choice framework, which considers self-interest (in terms of 
receiving benefits, or the expectation of collecting them in the future) as the main underlying 
motive for the observed policy preference. Variables such as parenthood or grandparenthood 
and related motivations (altruism), which could grasp the demographic life-course notion of 
possible age effects, are not included in their model. 
Therefore, inconsistencies identified in the empirical analysis by Busemeyer et al. cannot 
be explained: the fact that many older retired people in Germany are not in favour of 
decreases in forms of spending they no longer benefit from, such as unemployment or 
education, may seem counterintuitive if we assume that people are motivated by self-interest. 
The authors conclude that more attention has to be paid to the underlying norms and values 
of preferences. 
In this paper, we seek to tackle the obvious shortcomings of a basic political economy 
approach by adding a demographic life-course perspective to the economic life cycle phases. 
This will also enable us to look deeper into the underlying motives of preferences, as it allows 
us to use altruism as an explanation for preferences, which are seemingly inconsistent in the 
self-interest context (see also Schokkaert 2006). Like Busemeyer et al., we would argue, for 
example, that older people are also very likely to have children and/or grandchildren who are 
at risk of becoming unemployed; as a consequence, (grand)parents are dynastically altruistic 
and do not support cuts in unemployment benefits to the same extent as older people who are 
childless. In order to test this hypothesis, however, variables like (grand)parenthood would 
have to be included into the empirical model. In the following, we will briefly present our 
analytical framework, which is illustrated by Graph 1. 
 
From an economic life-cycle to a demographic life-course perspective 
In a simple redistributive context of a specific transfer, there are basically two groups of 
individuals: beneficiaries (recipients) and non-beneficiaries (contributors). The group of 
beneficiaries also includes those individuals who do not currently receive the benefit, but who 
are potentially eligible to receive it at a certain time. The tendency to support a specific benefit 
depends on the individual’s socioeconomic position (income). As introduced by Busemeyer et 
al., it also depends on the individual’s position in the economic life cycle (= “age”), which also 
determines the individual’s likelihood to be beneficiary or not. The underlying motives for 
these preferences are various forms of self-interest (e.g., material self interest, social prestige, 
reciprocity; for a systematic overview of motives for public transfers see Wilkoszewski 2008). 
As outlined above, this concept cannot explain the case of individuals who support a specific 
transfer, even though they are not recipients of this benefit or cannot expect to become 
beneficiaries in the future. Neither it is able to provide reasons for a (hypothetical) situation in 
which beneficiaries are not supporting the transfer they receive. Retirees, for example, could 
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option for providing essential transfers to the younger generation. 
These seemingly counterintuitive social policy preferences require another dimension of 
motives in order to be analysed and explained: altruism. Since the set of motivations for 
transfers can be understood as a continuum between pure egoism and pure pro-social 
attitudes, it is possible to introduce sub-categories for both altruism and self-interest 
(Wilkoszewski 2008, Schokkaert 2006). In the context of the research question at hand, we 
distinguish between two forms of altruism: dynastic altruism and societal altruism. Both kinds 
are triggered by demographic life-course events and phases: i.e., parenthood, 
grandparenthood, and, to a certain extent, marriage. Dynastic altruism – which in economic 
studies on intra-family transfers (bequests) is also referred to as “intergenerational altruism” – 
motivates parents and grandparents to support public transfers which they do not benefit 
from directly, but which are directed towards their children or grandchildren. Examples could 
be educational transfers or, in the case of grandparents, child benefits or other family policies. 
Societal altruism, on the other hand, assumes that individuals with offspring are also more 
likely than childless people to support transfers towards the younger generation as a whole. 
The experience of having or not having raised children (and by doing so contributing to the 
continuance of society) might determine a person’s general attitude on intergenerational 





















Graph 1: Theoretical framework 
 
 
  10III Research design, data and methods 
 
Based on the research gaps identified in the literature overview, as well as our theoretical 




(1) Social policy preferences differ across age. 
The elderly are less in favour of public transfers to the young than the 




(2) Social policy preferences differ between (grand)parents and (grand)childless people. 
(Grand)childless people are less in favour of public transfers to the young 
and are more in favour of public upward transfers than (grand)parents. 
 
 
(3) Social policy preferences differ between married and unmarried people. 
Unmarried people are less in favour of public downward transfers than 
married people. 
 
In addition to the main covariates of interest (age and (grand)parenthood), the statistical 
models developed hereafter will also control for further important factors such as sex, 
socioeconomic status, differences between East and West Germany, current benefit 
entitlements and general attitudes. 
For our analysis, we use the most recent data suitable to addressing the questions at 
hand: the German Population and Policy Acceptance Survey (PPAS 2003) and the German 
Generations and Gender Survey (GGS 2005). Both cross-sectional datasets have a large 
sample size (over 4,000 and over 10,000 respondents, respectively) and include an identical set 
of questions concerning preferences on 13 family policies, which we use as a proxy for public 
downward transfers. By applying the same model of support for these transfers to two 
independent surveys, it is possible to test the robustness of the coefficients found. 
Furthermore, each dataset has its specific features that justify the use of both surveys in our 
analysis: on the one hand, the PPAS contains a question on preferences with regard to eight 
pension policies, which allows for a complementary analysis of demographic effects on 
upward transfer preferences; while on the other hand, the GGS provides information on 
grandparenthood, which unfortunately is not included in the PPAS dataset. 
As a first step, we apply classical Generalised Linear Models (GLM, logistic regression) 
to identify the impact of demographic factors on transfer preferences at particular ages. Since 
linearity of coefficients is one of the basic assumptions of these models, we use Generalised 
Additive Models (GAM) in a second step to assess the patterns of age effects found over the 
(synthetic) life course. This not only allows us to identify possible age trajectories of social 
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outlined in our theoretical framework. In the following, we will present the model 
specifications used for both datasets in more detail. 
 
 
Model specifications – dependent variables 
The PPAS and GGS datasets contain a battery of practically identical items on 13 family 
policies which cover a whole range of public downward transfers (money, time, education, and 
housing, see Table 1). Respondents were asked to evaluate the importance of each of these 
policies: 
 
“What do you think about the following policies which are supposed to 
help families in having, raising and caring for children? Are you more in 
favour or more against these measures? These policies are not fictitious; 
most of them do exist in some European countries. A few have also 
been implemented in Germany, or were taken into consideration by 
policymakers.” 
 
  Family policy  Transfer type 
1  Better marital leave schemes for working 
mothers 
Time 
2  Lower income taxes for parents of minor 
children 
Money 
3  Better childcare facilities for children under 
the age of 3 
Time / Care 
4 
Better childcare facilities for children from 
the age of 3 to the age of primary school 
entry 
Time / Care 
5  Financial bonus for families with children 
(means-tested) 
Money 
6  Financial bonus at birth of a child  Money 
7 
Financial assistance for mothers or fathers 
who give up their jobs because they want to 
look after their minor children 
Money 
8  A substantial increase in child benefits to € 
250 per child and month 
Money 
9 
Care facilities for children of school age for 
the time before and after school hours, as 
well as during school holidays 
Time / Care 
10  Flexible working hours for working parents 
with small children 
Time 
11  More and better part-time work 
opportunities for parents with children 
Time 
12  Significantly cheaper costs for education  Education / Money 
13  Better housing for families with children  Housing / Money 
 
Table 1: Family policies and respective type of transfer 
PPAS 2003 and GGS 2005 (item 12 here: “More all day schools”) 
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variable (resulting in 13 logistic regression estimations). To do so, we dichotomise the 
variables, with 1 representing those respondents who fully agree or agree with the proposed 
reform, and 0 for all other responses.
a Depending on the transfer type, between 11 and almost 
30 percent of respondents oppose the proposed reforms in both datasets. The highest levels 
of rejection concern mostly money transfers (6 and 8). 
With regard to public upward transfers, only the PPAS contains a suitable question 
which asks the respondents’ views on various policies designed to sustain the current pay-as-
you-go-pension system in Germany: 
 
“Many people fear that the state will not be able to pay for their public 
pensions after they retire. There are several options for securing the 
financial basis of the public pension system. Please select from the 
following options the policy which you would most like to see 
implemented for that purpose.”
b 
 
Respondents were asked to select from a range of 10 policies, some of them putting a greater 
burden on the younger generation, and some of them asking for more contributions from the 
elderly (see Table 2 below). 
 
  Pension policy  Transfer direction 
1  Raising the official retirement age  Downward 
2  Increase in income taxes  Upward 
3  Reduction in monthly pension payments  Downward 
4  Force children to support their parents  Upward 
5  Abolish early retirement programmes  Downward 
6 
Make amount of monthly pension 
payments dependent on number of 
children 
Downward 
7  Put extra burden on certain groups within 
society 
Upward 
8  Fight unemployment  n.a. 
9  More private pension plans  n.a. 
10  Pay pensions only to those, who paid 
contributions into the system 
Upward 
 
Table 2: Pension policies and respective direction of transfer; PPAS 2003 
 
                                                 
a   Even though the sample size is rather big, some spells would contain too few cases when using ordered 
logistic regression, resulting in non-significance of most effects found. By dichotomising the variables we avoid 
this problem. 
b   Respondents were also asked to give a second choice. However, for our subsequent statistical analysis we 
will not consider the second policy option given by the respondent. We argue that in this type of question, the 
actual policy preference is made clear by ranking the policy option as the “preferred” one, leaving the second 
option with lesser power to identify policy preferences (as the question is not an “either-or” one). 
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respectively: 2, 4, 7 and 10 are upward transfers in the sense that they put a burden on the 
younger generation in order to ensure pensions for the older generation; while 1, 3, 5 and 6 
put the burden on the older generation, and can be therefore seen as a proxy for downward 
transfers. Policies 8 and 9 (fight unemployment and more private pension plans) cannot be 
clearly assigned to either direction of transfers. Hence, we exclude these from our sample (this 
also seems to be justified given that, with a frequency of 0.5 percent and 1.9 percent, 
respectively, they do not influence the sample very much). The dependent variable is 
constructed by recoding responses favouring upward transfers into 1, and those preferring 
downward transfers into 0, with the latter making up roughly 20 percent of responses. 
 
 
Model specifications – independent variables 
The dependent variables of our binary logit model are predicted by a function of the following 
covariates (Table 3 below). 
 
Age of the respondent 
Range: 20 – 65 years (PPAS); 17 – 85 (GGS) 
 
Childlessness 
1 if the respondent is childless, 0 if other 
 
Grandparenthood 
1 if the respondent has grandchildren, 0 if other (not included in the PPAS data) 
 
Area of residence 
1 if West Germany, 0 if East Germany 
 
Current benefits 
1 if respondent receives child benefits, 0 if other (not included in the model for pension policies) 
 
Educational level 
1 if higher education, 0 if other 
 
Sex 
1 for male, 0 for female respondents 
 
Respondent’s marital status 
1 if married, 0 if other 
 
Conservatism 
Proxy for respondent’s conservatism; 1 if conservative, 0 if other 
 
Net household income 
1 if below the median (€ 2000.--), 0 if above 
 
Net household income (imputed) 
1 if below the median (€ 2000.--), 0 if above 
 
Imputation dummy 
1 if missing case in the household income variable was replaced by variable mean, 0 if other 
 
Table 3: Independent variables 
 
In addition to the demographic variables, we control for economic factors, such as education 
and household income. The latter usually shows higher levels of missing cases than other 
variables. In order to evaluate the impact of these missing cases on our results, we run the 
  14logit model with the original income variable, as well as with an imputed variable.
c When 
using the imputed variable, the model is extended by an imputation dummy. 
                                                
We also include variables measuring potentially important attitudinal effects. The first is 
a variable on the area of residence: since respondents in West and East Germany have 
experienced fundamentally different welfare state regimes, they may have different preference 
levels concerning child benefits. General political views might also play a role. A respondent 
who, for example, favours a significant increase in child benefits may generally support the 
younger generation. However, this response may also be an expression of a conservative 
political view, since more generous state transfers to the child advantages the male-
breadwinner model. Therefore, we include a covariate to test for these attitudes. In the PPAS, 
interviewees were asked several questions on general relations between men and women, and 
the role of institutions like marriage or the family. One item asked whether respondents 
believe that couples who want to have children should marry (dummy: yes/no). We use this 
variable as a proxy for identifying possible effects of conservative attitudes on the dependent 
variable.
d 
In the logit models on family policy preferences, we also control for strong positive 
attitudes of current beneficiaries regarding the policy measures under question. As a proxy, we 
use information on whether or not the respondent received child benefits at the time of the 
survey, coding beneficiaries as 1, and all other respondents as 0. 
For each dependent variable we run up to five different model specifications: 1) 
including all covariates without imputing the missing cases of the household income variable, 
2) including all covariates with imputation, 3) including only significant variables, 4) including 
only demographic variables 5) and including only demographic and significant variables.
e 
The central specification for the Generalised Additive Models is the same as for the 
logit model, except for the fact that the independent variable age is entered into the model via 
a smoothing function (Hastie and Tibshirani 1990). For each of the dependent variables, we 
run only two model specifications: 1) including all covariates and with imputation of the 
household income and 2) including age as the only covariate. The latter allows us to analyse 
the interaction between age and other covariates: in the full model we expect to identify the 
“pure” age trajectory of policy preferences by controlling for all relevant other factors; while 
in the restricted model with age as the only variable, we expect to find different patterns, as 
the age effect is distorted by other life-course effects, such as parenthood, which are not 
controlled for. Because our goal is to assess the trajectories of age effects found over the life 
course, and since the coefficient estimates of the GLM and the GAM are identical, we will 




c   Missing cases replaced by variable mean (€ 1993.--). 
d   Due to the different phrasing of attitudinal questions, we use a different proxy for the GGS dataset: here 
one item included the question, i.e., whether respondents support the idea of abolishing the right to divorce 
(dichotomous response yes/no). 
e   Model specification 5 only applicable depending on model results of other specifications. For the full 
model we test for collinearity of the covariates. The Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) are clearly below 2.5 for all 
covariates, thus giving no concern for collinear relationships between the variables included into the model. 
  15IV Results 
 
This section of the paper contains the results of the GLM and GAM estimations. For the sake 
of a clear and efficient presentation of results, logistic regressions tables are only displayed for 
the PPAS dataset. The second part of this section will then address eventual differences 
compared to the coefficients obtained from the logit models based on the GGS dataset. The 
third part will highlight findings of the GAMs for both datasets combined. 
 
 
1 Demographic effects on transfer preferences 
1.1 Public downward transfers – family policies 
In the following, the results of the binary logit models for the 13 family policies are grouped 
according to the type of transfer (monetary, time, education, housing). 
 
Preferences towards monetary public downward transfers 
As outlined in Table 1, family policies which mainly address monetary transfers include lower 
taxes for parents (2), a means-tested financial bonus for families (5), a financial bonus at birth 
(6), financial assistance to parents who give up their jobs (7) and a substantial increase in child 
benefits (8).
f 
Tables 4 through 8 in the Annex present the results for all models concerning attitudes 
towards these policies. We find large and highly significant age effects in all of them, with an 
odds ratio range of 0.959 and 0.987, depending on the model specification and the monetary 
transfer type. The highest effect can be found with regard to a significant increase in child 
benefits (Table 8). In Model 4, the odds of supporting the introduction of this policy 
decreases by 4.1 percent per year of age. When comparing the youngest with the oldest 
respondent in the sample, the effect adds up to an odds ratio of 0.959
45=0.152; i.e., the odds 
of a 65-year-old respondent (fully) agreeing with the policy are 84.8 percent lower than those 
of a 20-year-old. 
Parenthood plays an equally important role in determining preferences regarding the 
five family policies; the coefficients found are large and highly significant for all models and all 
policies. The odds of a childless person supporting the introduction of a significant increase in 
child benefits are almost 50 percent lower than those of a respondent with children (Models 1, 
2 and 3 in Table 8); while in the restricted Model 4, the odds are, at 77.5 percent, even lower. 
The range of the parenthood effect lies between an odds ratio of 0.312 (Model 4, Table 4, 
policy: lower taxes for parents) and 0.627 (Model 2, Table 7 in the Annex). 
With regard to the other demographic variables, only gender seems to have an effect on 
downward transfer preferences, while the coefficients for marital status are all marginal and 
non-significant. In general, men tend to support the five family policies to a lesser extent than 
women, with significant gender differences of between 15 and 30 percent for the following 
                                                 
f   Numbers in parentheses are referring to the order of policies in Table 1. 
  16policy options: benefits for parents who give up their job, financial bonus at birth and increase 
in child benefits. 
Large differences in preferences can also be found between respondents who currently 
benefit from downward transfers and those who do not: the odds of supporting, for example, 
an increase in child benefits are twice as large among those respondents who received this 
transfer at the time when the survey was conducted, as among those who did not (Table 8). 
Of the socioeconomic factors included into our models, only educational attainment 
seems to influence social policy preferences, leaving household income with small and non-
significant effects.
g People with high school degrees are 20 percent less prone to support an 
increase in child benefits, and are 40 percent less prone to support a financial bonus at birth 
(Table 6), than are respondents with lower educational levels. 
There are also considerable and highly significant regional differences. Among 
respondents in Western Germany, the odds of supporting higher monthly payments for 
children are over 50 percent lower than among interviewees in Eastern Germany (Table 8). At 
65 percent, the variation in opinions with regard to a financial bonus at birth (Table 6) is even 
higher. 
Finally, the covariate testing for the effect of broader attitudinal effects only provides 
significant coefficients in the case of a financial bonus at birth: conservative respondents are 
40 percent more prone to support this policy than more liberal interviewees (Table 6). 
 
Preferences towards public downward transfers providing more time for parents and families 
In a further step, we look at those downward transfers which are supposed to provide parents 
and families with more time, facilitating better childcare and parent-child relations. This 
transfer type includes the following family policies: better marital leave schemes for working 
mothers (1), better childcare facilities for children under the age of three (3), better childcare 
facilities for children from the age of three to the age of primary school entry (4), care facilities 
for children of school age for the time before and after school hours, as well as during school 
holidays (9), flexible working hours for working parents with small children (10) and more and 
better part-time work opportunities for parents with children (11).
h 
Tables 9 through 14 in the Annex present the results for all models concerning these 
policies. As in the case of monetary downward transfers, age does play a role in influencing 
opinions regarding this set of policies, though to a much lesser degree. This is not surprising, 
as transfers in time appear to have far smaller consequences for the state budget, hence 
providing less potential for conflict between age groups. 
A highly significant age effect can be found concerning more flexible working hours for 
parents: the odds of supporting this policy decrease by about 1.5 percent per year of age, 
amounting to a change in odds of about 50 percent between a 20-year-old and a 65-year-old 
respondent (Table 14). A smaller but still significant age effect of about 1.0 percent change in 
                                                 
g   The model results also show that changing sample sizes due to missing cases in the household income 
variable do not affect the coefficients found, as they have similar values and significance levels in both imputed 
and non-imputed samples. 
h   Numbers in parentheses refer to the order of policies in Table 1. 
  17odds appears with the policy options “better marital leave schemes” and “better part-time 
work opportunities for parents” (Tables 9 and 13 [Models 4 and 5]). For the three other family 
policies, age does not seem to play a role. 
Parenthood, however, appears to be as important for determining public downward 
transfers in the form of time as for monetary transfers. In this case as well, the coefficients 
found are large and highly significant for all models analysing four out of the six family 
policies (flexible working hours, better part-time work opportunities, better childcare facilities 
after school, better day care for children above the age of three). The odds of a childless 
person supporting the introduction of flexible working hours for parents are more than 50 
percent lower than those of a respondent with children (Table 14); in the case of better part-
time work opportunities, the odds change amounts to about 60 percent (Table 13).  
With regard to the other demographic variables of interest, the coefficients for marital 
status are all marginal and non-significant.
i Again, only gender seems to have an effect on 
downward transfer preferences with high significance values and considerable coefficients for 
all model specifications and all six family policies. In general, men tend to support these to a 
lesser extent than women, with an odds change of about 25 to 35 percent. 
In contrast to the case of monetary downward transfers, whether the respondent 
received child benefits at the time of the survey, does not have an impact on preferences for 
these six family policies; the coefficients are to a large extent marginal, and are all non-
significant. Education and household income also show no effect, except for the policy option 
“better part-time work” (Table 13), which respondents with higher education tend to support 
more than those with lower educational attainment. 
On the other hand, the differences between Western and Eastern German expectations 
towards transfers organised by the state also seem to manifest themselves in this set of “time” 
transfers. They are considerable and highly significant for all model specifications; with an 
odds change of about 20 percent (better marital leave schemes) to 60 percent (better childcare 
facilities after school and during holidays). Western Germans are clearly less in favour of these 
transfers than Eastern German respondents.  
Finally, when looking at the three policies which focus on establishing more child care 
facilities of different kinds, we find that conservative respondents are clearly less prone to 
support these transfers than interviewees with more liberal attitudes (odds changes from 17.2 
to 25.5 percent, see Tables 10, 11 and 12). 
 
Preferences towards public downward transfers providing lower education costs and better housing 
In addition to monetary and time downward transfers, our analysis also includes family 
policies designed to provide cheaper education and better housing to families. While these 
goods are in a sense connected to monetary transfers, we argue that they constitute their own 
categories, since they each target a specific policy field: education and infrastructure. Tables 15 
and 16 present the results of the binary logit models. Compared to the other transfer types, 
                                                 
i   Except for the policy option “better day care for children below the age of three,” which married people 
are less prone to support than unmarried people (26.8 percent odds change, see Model 4 in Table 10). 
  18age does not play an important role in determining preferences. The effects are either small or 
non-significant. 
However, parenthood again seems to be of even greater importance: the odds of a childless 
person supporting better housing for families are about 40 percent lower than for a 
respondent with children (Table 16), while in the case of lower education costs, the effect 
varies between almost 50 percent and about 30 percent, depending on the model specification 
(Table 15). When we look at the other demographic variables included in the model, we see 
results similar to those observed for the other two sets of transfers, with coefficients for 
marital status being marginal and non-significant, and those for gender having a high 
significance, with men being roughly 20 percent less prone than women to support the 
policies. 
Receiving benefits at the time of the survey has a clear impact on preferences for lower 
education costs, but is non-significant for better housing. By contrast, household income only 
has an effect on the latter policy, with the odds of supporting the measure being about a third 
higher for a household with a net income below the median. The effect of educational level 
appears to be of the same magnitude and significance as for monetary transfer policies. 
An interesting deviation from the effect of the area of residence can be observed: 
whereas in all other models, Western Germans are clearly less prone to support the policy, the 
odds that West Germans will be in favour of “better housing for families” are roughly 75 
percent higher than those of respondents living in East Germany. A possible explanation for 
this could be that, throughout West Germany, housing for families is much more expensive 
than in the former area of the GDR, where there actually is an oversupply of housing. 
 
 
1.2 Public upward transfers – pension policies 
To complement our preceding analysis on intergenerational family policies, we also look at 
preferences regarding intergenerational upward transfers. As a proxy for these, we use support 
levels for pension policy options, which would place greater burdens on the younger 
generation in order to sustain the German pension system. Table 17 in the Annex displays the 
results of the binary logit models. 
Commensurate with the negative age effect on preferences regarding downward 
transfers, we find a clear positive age effect on preferences toward upward transfers: the older 
the respondent is, the more prone he or she is to favour a pension-policy mix that places 
greater burdens on the younger generation. The odds ratio changes by about one percent per 
year of age depending on the model specification, and therefore is somewhat smaller than in 
the downward transfer models. The significance levels are also lower, yet the effect is distinct: 
the odds of a 65-year-old respondent (fully) agreeing with the policy mix are 71.1 percent 
(since 1.012
45=1.711) higher than those of a 20-year-old.
  
The effect of parenthood is reversed, too. Whereas childless people are less in favour of 
family policies than fathers or mothers, they have significantly higher odds of supporting an 
increased burden for the younger generation: the odds change compared to parents ranges 
between 59.9 and 76 percent, depending on the model specification. 
  19Of the other covariates, only the East-/West-divide has a distinct and highly significant effect 
on upward transfer preferences; as in the downward transfer models, Western Germans see 
the state as less responsible for organising transfers between generations. 
 
 
2 Robustness of findings 
As the GGS dataset contained the same set of questions on downward transfer preferences, 
we were able to test the robustness of our findings. Furthermore, the demographic variables 
contained in these data provided a larger age range (up to 85 years), as well as information 
about whether or not the respondent has grandchildren, which is one of the main explanatory 
factors within our theoretical framework. The following brief comparison focuses on the 
demographic variables, and will not present detailed regression tables. Differences in the other 
covariates can be considered to be marginal. 
 
Demographic effects on downward transfers – Age 
The effects of age found in the PPAS analysis are extremely robust, and can be replicated on 
basis of the GGS data. Generally speaking, the odds changes are again higher for monetary 
transfers than for other types of transfers. However, we also identify some differences 
between the two datasets. Whereas in the PPAS analysis, no age effect was found for the 
policies concerning better day care for children below and above the age of three, differences 
across ages could be found in the GGS data concerning this policy preference, with a highly 
significant odds change of about one percent per year of life. In addition, the magnitude for 
the age effect found with the policy “better marital leave schemes” is larger in the GGS than 
in the PPAS data, and shows higher significance levels. 
 
Demographic effects on downward transfers – Parenthood and Grandparenthood 
In addition to age, parenthood seems again to be one of the most influential factors for 
shaping preferences toward public downward transfers, also on the basis of GGS data. In 
contrast to the PPAS analysis, we are able to replicate all results concerning this covariate with 
regards to both the magnitude of the effect and its significance levels. Only when looking at 
the policies “lower taxes for parents” and “better day care for children above the age of three” 
are the odds changes slightly smaller than in the PPAS analysis. 
Generally speaking, the odds of childless people finding public transfers to the younger 
generation “very important” or “important” are about 30 to 35 percent lower than for parents. 
In contrast to the PPAS analysis, we were also able to control for grandparenthood on the 
basis of GGS data. Having or not having grandchildren might be of a similar importance for 
shaping public transfer preferences as having children or being childless, especially at older 
ages. 
In literally all models, grandparenthood increases the odds of rating as “very important” 
or “important” the two indexed variables, as well as all 13 family policies separately. In most 
of the models, this effect is also significant or highly significant. With an odds change of 
  20between 10 and almost 45 percent, there is quite some variance in the results. The biggest 
effects can be found with regard to time-related public transfers. The highest odds changes 
concern the policies “flexible working hours for parents,” “better day care for children below 
and above the age of three” and “better marital leave schemes.” 
 
 
3 Age trajectories of social policy preferences 
Generalised Linear Models assume linearity of the effects found, i.e., in our case, a regular 
increase or decrease in the likelihood of supporting or opposing certain transfer policies by 
each single year of age. 
However, our analysis has shown that preferences are highly dependent on time-varying 
demographic factors, such as parenthood. Therefore, the age effects identified in our models 
might follow a non-linear pattern over the life course. They might be also dependent on 
economic factors, as suggested by the life-cycle perspective. 
In order to investigate these possible trajectories, we will present the graphical results 
from the GAM estimations for both datasets. All graphs will compare the baseline model, 
which includes only age as a covariate (therefore resulting in a “distorted” age effect) to the 
full model, which controls for all relevant demographic and economic variables (therefore 
giving the “pure” age effect). Based on our theoretical considerations, we expect that the 
baseline model underestimates the negative age effect found for most downward transfers, 
and underestimates the positive age effect found for the upward transfer during life-course 
phases, in which parenthood and grandparenthood are most likely. 
 
Age trajectories of preferences regarding monetary public downward transfers 
Monetary public downward transfers included in our analysis cover the following five family 
policies: lower taxes for parents (2), a means-tested financial bonus for families (5), a financial 
bonus at birth (6), financial assistance to parents who give up their jobs (7) and a substantial 
increase in child benefits (8).
j In the following, we will pay special attention to policies (2) and 
(8), since the age effects found follow quite remarkable non-linear traits, as shown in Graphs 2 
and 3 on the following page.
k 
Whereas on the basis of the full model a rather clearly linear negative age effect on 
support for a policy promoting lower taxes for parents can be identified (red line, Graph 2a), 
the restricted model (green line) reveals a pattern which can partially be attributed to the 
economic life cycle (“parenthood hump” in the age range 30 to 49). However, the 
“grandparent hump” in the age range 55 to 65 cannot be explained by economic self-interest 
motives, as tax benefits are directed to parents, and not to grandparents. We argue that, in this 
age group, the likelihood of becoming a grandfather or -mother leads to an underestimation of 
the “pure” age effect, as grandparents form their preferences in a setting of dynastic altruism, 
in which they support transfers directed to their grandchildren. Even though in the full model 
                                                 
j   Numbers in parentheses are referring to the order of policies in Table 1. 
k   The letters refer to the two datasets used, where a = PPAS and b = GGS. Note that the age axes of the 
two graphs differ. 
  21we do not control for grandparenthood, the variable “childlessness” obviously captures much 
of its effect, since a large fraction of parents in that age group also have grandchildren. When 
looking at the trajectories obtained from the GGS dataset, we find practically identical results 
with regard to parenthood. The trait for grandparenthood is not as pronounced as in the case 
of the PPAS. Yet the restricted model overestimates the support for the downward transfer in 
the higher age groups. 
 































































































































lower taxes for parents































































































































lower taxes for parents
 
Graphs 2a and b: Smoothed age effect on support for family policies (a=PPAS; b=GGS) 
 































































































































increase in child benefits































































































































increase in child benefits
 
Graphs 3a and b: Smoothed age effect on support for family policies (a=PPAS; b=GGS) 
 
The second monetary family policy, which provides for a substantial increase in child benefits, 
displays similar preference structures (Graphs 3a and b). When controlled for a range of 
possible life-course relevant covariates, the “pure” age effect follows an almost perfect linear 
  22pattern (as shown in the red line in Graph 3a), while the “distorted” age effect in the restricted 
model remains marginal up until the age of 40 (again, the period in which respondents are 
most likely to be exposed to parenthood), and follows a rather steep slope downwards 
thereafter. An almost identical pattern can be found in the trajectories based on GGS data. In 
addition, we find a clear grandparenthood effect here, which disappears in the full model 
when controlled for grandparenthood. Our interpretation of the corresponding underlying 
motivations (dynastic altruism) also appears to be supported in this case. 
 
Age trajectories of preferences regarding public downward transfers providing more time for parents 
The second group of public downward transfers include policies designed to provide parents 
and families with more time, facilitating better childcare and parent-child relations. This 
transfer type includes the following family policies: better marital leave schemes for working 
mothers (1), better childcare facilities for children under the age of three (3), better childcare 
facilities for children from the age of three to the age of primary school entry (4), care facilities 
for children of school age for the time before and after school hours, as well as during school 
holidays (9), flexible working hours for working parents with small children (10) and more and 
better part-time work opportunities for parents with children (11).
l 
Policies (1), (3), (10) and (11) mostly follow some U-shape trajectory (parent and 
grandparent hump), but with less pronounced age differences than seen for the monetary 
downward transfers. Results obtained from the two datasets show only marginal differences. 
In the following, we will focus on policies (4) and (9), as they produce more diverse 
trajectories (Graphs 4 and 5). 
In the linear models applied, we could not find significant or even marginal age effects 
for support for better childcare facilities for children above the age of three, or for 
schoolchildren before and after school. This holds for both datasets. 
When looking at the graphical results of the additive models, it becomes clear that the 
linear model will not detect effects where non-linear traits cancel each other out over the 
whole age span, as is the case for the PPAS dataset. Graphs 4a and 5a display the respective 
age trajectories, which once again tend to support the hypothesis that preferences for transfer-
related policies are highly dependent on the life-course phase the respondent finds him- or 
herself in. Both trajectories show clear parent and grandparent humps: during the ages in 
which these demographic effects are more likely, the negative age effect is reversed. In the 
case of school-related childcare, the first hump covers the age range 25 to 45, which is exactly 
the period in which respondents are likely to have children of school age. When looking at the 
age effect on support for better day care for children above the age of three, we can identify a 
second, smaller parent hump around the age of the parents, at which a potential second child 
would turn three. These results can be  replicated on the basis of the GGS dataset only for 
preferences regarding the policy “childcare for children above the age of three,” and not for 
school-related childcare (Graphs 4b and 5b). 
 
 
                                                 
l   Numbers in parentheses refer to the order of policies in Table 1. 
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better day care > 3yrs
 
Graphs 4a and b: Smoothed age effect on support for family policies (a=PPAS; b=GGS) 
 































































































































better child care before and after school hours































































































































better child care before and after school hours
 
Graphs 5a and b: Smoothed age effect on support for family policies (a=PPAS; b=GGS) 
 
Age trajectories of preferences regarding public upward transfers: pension policies 
Finally we look at the graphical results of the GAM analysing the support for upward 
transfers, which are shown in Graph 6. The baseline model gives a slightly U-shaped 
trajectory, with support ratios at younger ages being almost as high as the ones at higher ages. 
This seemingly “altruistic” preference can also be explained from the perspective of self-
interest: in a context of reciprocity, young people might be willing to bear a higher burden to 
help sustain high pension levels because they will be beneficiaries when they are older. 
However, we also find evidence for our demographic life-course framework: as expected, the 
baseline-model underestimates the positive age effect with increasing age. When controlled for 
parenthood, the positive age effect is at a higher level. 































































































































pension reforms, which put burden on the young
 






This paper was prepared in response to growing concerns about an emerging conflict between 
young and old over public resources in Germany, which is triggered on the one hand by 
demographic change, and on the other hand by budgetary constraints and social policy shifts. 
In our introduction, we pointed out that, in contrast to the conventional view, demographic 
change cannot be reduced to population ageing in the intergenerational context; its effects on 
family structures (growing numbers of childless and unmarried people) have to be taken into 
account as well, since they are equally crucial for determining redistributive policy needs. 
In order to assess the plausibility of a conflict over public intergenerational transfers, 
policy preferences of different demographic groups and their underlying motivations are key. 
Not much research has been devoted to this matter so far. Our literature overview identified a 
persisting research gap on the question of how demographic factors, particularly age, influence 
public transfer preferences. Furthermore, the few studies addressing this issue have provided 
contradictory results, and often frame their analysis using an economic life-cycle perspective. 
Here, age is conceptualised along phases of labour market participation (education, work, 
retirement) which constitute the beneficiary groups of different redistributive policies 
(education, unemployment, pensions). In this context, the underlying motives of related 
preferences can only be explained through forms of self-interest. As a consequence, the 
reasons for counterintuitive, possibly altruistic preference outcomes remain open. We 
therefore suggest extending the conventional economic life-cycle concept by adding a 
demographic life-course perspective, which allows us to take into account forms of altruistic 
motivations in explaining seemingly inconsistent findings. In analytical terms, this requires us 
  25to consider further demographic variables (parenthood, grandparenthood, marriage), which so 
far has hardly been done. 
The empirical analyses of this paper were designed accordingly, and were based not 
only on standard statistical estimation procedures, but also on newer techniques which 
allowed us to identify possible age trajectories of social policy preferences over the life course. 
In terms of data, we opted to use a comprehensive set of family policies as proxies for 
downward transfers, as these appeared to be more suitable for testing our demographic life-
course perspective argument than education, which is used by most existing studies. 
Furthermore, we were able to test the robustness of our findings by applying our models to 
two large independent surveys. 
The results of the standard logistic regression models showed strong and highly 
significant effects of age, parenthood and grandparenthood on social preferences. In general, 
older and childless respondents were shown to be less prone to support public transfers to 
families with children, and more prone to prefer pension policies which place a greater burden 
on the younger generation. However, the age trajectories of our Generalised Additive Models 
revealed that there are significant deviations from this finding, especially when looking at 
grandparents, who tend to support transfers which they do not directly benefit from. 
Following our concept of a demographic life-course perspective, we attributed this preference, 
which would be inconsistent in an economic life-cycle view, to dynastic altruism motives. All 
central findings were highly robust, and could be replicated on the basis of the second dataset. 
Future research will further develop the ad hoc theoretical framework provided in this 
paper, with a special focus on underlying motivations for social policy preferences. As this 
paper focused on Germany, we recommend extending the analysis to additional countries, and 
conducting a larger international comparison. 
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  Family policy  Transfer type 
1  Better marital leave schemes for working 
mothers 
Time 
2  Lower income taxes for parents of minor 
children 
Money 
3  Better childcare facilities for children under 
the age of 3 
Time / Care 
4 
Better childcare facilities for children from 
the age of 3 to the age of primary school 
entry 
Time / Care 
5  Financial bonus for families with children 
(means-tested) 
Money 
6  Financial bonus at birth of a child  Money 
7 
Financial assistance for mothers or fathers 
who give up their jobs because they want to 
look after their minor children 
Money 
8  A substantial increase of child benefits to € 
250 per child and month 
Money 
9 
Care facilities for children of school age for 
the time before and after school hours, as 
well as during school holidays 
Time / Care 
10  Flexible working hours for working parents 
with small children 
Time 
11  More and better part-time work 
opportunities for parents with children 
Time 
12  Significantly cheaper costs for education  Education / Money 
13  Better housing for families with children  Housing / Money 
 
Table 1: Family policies and respective type of transfer 










  27  Pension policy  Transfer direction 
1  Raising the official retirement age  Downward 
2  Increase in income taxes  Upward 
3  Reduction of monthly pension payments  Downward 
4  Force children to support their parents  Upward 
5  Abolish early retirement programmes  Downward 
6 
Make amount of monthly pension 
payments dependent on number of 
children 
Downward 
7  Put extra burden on certain groups within 
society 
Upward 
8  Fight unemployment  n.a. 
9  More private pension plans  n.a. 
10  Pay pensions only to those who paid 
contributions into the system 
Upward 
 
Table 2: Pension policies and respective direction of transfer; PPAS 2003 
 
 
Age of the respondent 
Range: 20 – 65 years (PPAS); 17 – 85 (GGS) 
 
Childlessness 
1 if the respondent is childless, 0 if other 
 
Grandparenthood 
1 if the respondent has grandchildren, 0 if other (not included in the PPAS data) 
 
Area of residence 
1 if West Germany, 0 if East Germany 
 
Current benefits 
1 if respondent receives child benefits, 0 if other (not included in the model for pension policies) 
 
Educational level 
1 if higher education, 0 if other 
 
Sex 
1 for male, 0 for female respondents 
 
Respondent’s marital status 
1 if married, 0 if other  
 
Conservatism 
Proxy for respondent’s conservatism; 1 if conservative, 0 if other 
 
Net household income 
1 if below the median (€ 2000.--), 0 if above 
 
Net household income (imputed) 
1 if below the median (€ 2000.--), 0 if above 
 
Imputation dummy 
1 if missing case in the household income variable was replaced by variable mean, 0 if other 
 
Table 3: Independent variables 
  28Binary Logit Models Predicting Support for Downward Transfers: PPAS 2003
Family Policy: Lower Taxes for Parents
Variable
Age 0.976 *** 0.976 *** 0.974 *** 0.968 ***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
Childlessness 0.378 *** 0.419 *** 0.427 *** 0.312 ***
(0.152) (0.144) (0.137) (0.113)
Area of Residence 1.012 0.992
(0.123) (0.120)




Sex 0.915 0.928 0.929
(0.099) (0.094) (0.093)
Marital Status 0.866 0.908 1.038
(0.132) (0.125) (0.112)








Constant 23.162 *** 22.255 *** 21.454 *** 41.557 ***
(0.308) (0.292) (0.262) (0.212)
Nagelkerke R
2 0.069 0.071 0.068 0.061
Hosmer/Lemeshow 0.118 0.125 0.535 0.536
-2 Log likelihood
N 3,718 3,959 3,994 4,059
°p < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
3097.444 3180.487
Model 1
Odds Ratios (Standard Errors in Parentheses)
2841.444 3120.751




Table 4: Support for public downward transfers, regression results; PPAS 2003 
 
  29Binary Logit Models Predicting Support for Downward Transfers: PPAS 2003
Family Policy: Financial Bonus for Families, Means-tested
Variable
Age 0.983 *** 0.982 *** 0.982 *** 0.982 ***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
Childlessness 0.419 *** 0.449 *** 0.403 *** 0.429 ***
(0.145) (0.140) (0.101) (0.112)
Area of Residence 0.784 * 0.784 * 0.787 *
(0.122) (0.119) (0.117)




Sex 0.883 0.877 0.856 °
(0.091) (0.089) (0.087)




HH income 1.374 **
(0.100)
HH income (imputed) 1.363 ** 1.269 **
(0.099) (0.091)
Imputation dummy 1.254 1.325
(0.196) (0.190)
Constant 12.484 *** 14.316 *** 17.277 *** 16.584 ***
(0.246) (0.278) (0.217) (0.195)
Nagelkerke R
2 0.047 0.045 0.040 0.035
Hosmer/Lemeshow 0.042 0.233 0.041 0.008
-2 Log likelihood
N 3,683 3,960 4,071 4,061
°p < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
3483.831 3520.403
Model 1
Odds Ratios (Standard Errors in Parentheses)
3221.225 3524.797
Model 4 Model 2 Model 3
  
Table 5: Support for public downward transfers, regression results; PPAS 2003 
  30  
Table 6: Support for public downward transfers, regression results; PPAS 2003 
  31Binary Logit Models Predicting Support for Downward Transfers: PPAS 2003
Family Policy: Benefits for Parents, who give up their Job to take care of Children
Variable
Age 0.985 *** 0.986 ** 0.987 ** 0.978 ***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Childlessness 0.587 *** 0.627 *** 0.609 *** 0.456 ***
(0.138) (0.133) (0.126) (0.107)
Area of Residence 0.905 0.900
(0.112) (0.109)




Sex 0.725 *** 0.714 *** 0.705 *** 0.704 ***
(0.088) (0.085) (0.084) (0.084)










Constant 9.983 *** 9.612 *** 9.545 *** 17.740 ***
(0.276) (0.265) (0.239) (0.188)
Nagelkerke R
2 0.058 0.054 0.053 0.045
Hosmer/Lemeshow 0.157 0.216 0.108 0.037
-2 Log likelihood
N 3,720 3,963 4,027 4,063
°p < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
3680.074 3763.297
Model 1
Odds Ratios (Standard Errors in Parentheses)
3412.812 3720.023
Model 4 Model 2 Model 3
  
Table 7: Support for public downward transfers, regression results; PPAS 2003 
  32Binary Logit Models Predicting Support for Downward Transfers: PPAS 2003
Family Policy: Significant Increase in Child Benefits up to € 250.--
Variable
Age 0.969 *** 0.969 *** 0.968 *** 0.959 ***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
Childlessness 0.510 *** 0.542 *** 0.544 *** 0.325 ***
(0.127) (0.122) (0.117) (0.099)
Area of Residence 0.503 *** 0.479 *** 0.464 ***
(0.111) (0.109) (0.107)
Current benefits 1.946 *** 2.036 *** 1.974 ***
(0.120) (0.115) (0.112)
Education 0.786 ** 0.802 ** 0.799 **
(0.086) (0.082) (0.081)
Sex 0.874 ° 0.860 * 0.851 * 0.838 *
(0.080) (0.077) (0.076) (0.075)










Constant 23.002 *** 23.817 *** 26.090 *** 29.292 ***
(0.262) (0.251) (0.239) (0.175)
Nagelkerke R
2 0.115 0.118 0.117 0.085
Hosmer/Lemeshow 0.033 0.887 0.093 0.052
-2 Log likelihood
N 3,719 3,960 4,001 4,061
°p < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
4236.216 4425.017
Model 1
Odds Ratios (Standard Errors in Parentheses)
3916.147 4268.442
Model 3 Model 2 Model 4
 
 
Table 8: Support for public downward transfers, regression results; PPAS 2003 
 
  33Binary Logit Models Predicting Support for Downward Transfers: PPAS 2003
Family Policy: Better Marital Leave Schemes
Variable
Age 0.991 ° 0.990 * 0.994 * 0.988 **
(0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Childlessness 0.921 0.952 0.820 °
(0.146) (0.140) (0.110)
Area of Residence 0.806 ° 0.801 * 0.784 *
(0.116) (0.113) (0.109)




Sex 0.638 *** 0.653 *** 0.637 *** 0.647 ***
(0.091) (0.087) (0.084) (0.086)










Constant 9.527 *** 9.788 *** 9.857 *** 10.330 ***
(0.289) (0.277) (0.179) (0.189)
Nagelkerke R
2 0.023 0.022 0.102 0.102
Hosmer/Lemeshow 0.560 0.398 0.126 0.552
-2 Log likelihood
N 3,721 3,963 3,734 3,977
°p < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
Model 1
Odds Ratios (Standard Errors in Parentheses)
3335.155 4338.568
Model 4 Model 2 Model 3
3606.316 4695.389
  
Table 9: Support for public downward transfers, regression results; PPAS 2003 
  34Binary Logit Models Predicting Support for Downward Transfers: PPAS 2003
Family Policy: Better Day Care for Children under the Age of three
Variable
Age 0.996 0.997 0.996
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
Childlessness 0.808 0.857 0.796 *
(0.145) (0.139) (0.113)
Area of Residence 0.453 *** 0.449 *** 0.437 ***
(0.130) (0.127) (0.123)




Sex 0.733 *** 0.758 ** 0.758 ** 0.779 **
(0.088) (0.084) (0.081) (0.082)
Marital Status 0.859 0.823 ° 0.732 **
(0.115) (0.110) (0.099)
Conservativism 0.828 * 0.818 * 0.785 **
(0.091) (0.087) (0.081)
HH income 1.031 1.266 **
(0.098) (0.077)




Constant 14.981 *** 14.682 *** 11.286 *** 7.450 ***
(0.291) (0.279) (0.128) (0.182)
Nagelkerke R
2 0.033 0.033 0.030 0.010
Hosmer/Lemeshow 0.176 0.055 0.769 0.735
-2 Log likelihood
N 3,717 3,959 4,062 4,059
°p < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
3759.500 3891.051
Model 1
Odds Ratios (Standard Errors in Parentheses)
3455.221 3845.230
Model 4 Model 2 Model 3
  
Table 10: Support for public downward transfers, regression results; PPAS 2003 
  35Binary Logit Models Predicting Support for Downward Transfers: PPAS 2003
Family Policy: Better Day Care for Children from the Age of three
Variable
Age 0.994 0.996 0.994
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
Childlessness 0.620 ** 0.676 ** 0.732 ** 0.609 ***
(0.171) (0.164) (0.103) (0.130)
Area of Residence 0.503 *** 0.499 *** 0.508 ***
(0.158) (0.155) (0.151)




Sex 0.628 *** 0.660 *** 0.637 *** 0.644 ***
(0.107) (0.103) (0.101) (0.101)
Marital Status 0.920 0.875 0.822
(0.142) (0.136) (0.123)








Constant 33.370 *** 30.128 *** 23.015 *** 16.907 ***
(0.347) (0.334) (0.163) (0.223)
Nagelkerke R
2 0.039 0.035 0.034 0.102
Hosmer/Lemeshow 0.225 0.046 0.919 0.552
-2 Log likelihood
N 3,723 3,964 4,046 3,977
°p < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
2803.105 4695.389
Model 1
Odds Ratios (Standard Errors in Parentheses)
2591.415 2838.608
Model 4 Model 2 Model 3
  
Table 11: Support for public downward transfers, regression results; PPAS 2003 
  36Binary Logit Models Predicting Support for Downward Transfers: PPAS 2003
Family Policy: Better Childcare Facilities before and after School and during Holidays
Variable
Age 0.997 1.000 0.999
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Childlessness 0.643 ** 0.711 * 0.720 *** 0.646 ***
(0.143) (0.138) (0.085) (0.107)
Area of Residence 0.387 *** 0.380 *** 0.381 ***
(0.135) (0.133) (0.130)




Sex 0.602 *** 0.626 *** 0.623 *** 0.631 ***
(0.088) (0.084) (0.083) (0.083)
Marital Status 0.919 0.943 0.842 °
(0.117) (0.112) (0.100)








Constant 20.438 *** 16.341 *** 16.135 *** 7.355 ***
(0.291) (0.279) (0.139) (0.182)
Nagelkerke R
2 0.061 0.054 0.054 0.023
Hosmer/Lemeshow 0.097 0.000 0.128 0.010
-2 Log likelihood
N 3,715 3,958 4,040 4,059
3742.051 3884.508
Model 1
Odds Ratios (Standard Errors in Parentheses)
3445.706 3792.991
Model 4 Model 2 Model 3
  
Table 12: Support for public downward transfers, regression results; PPAS 2003 
  37Binary Logit Models Predicting Support for Downward Transfers: PPAS 2003
Family Policy: Better Part-time Work Possibilities for Parents
Variable
Age 0.992 0.992 0.989 * 0.989 *
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
Childlessness 0.405 *** 0.432 *** 0.459 *** 0.400 *** 0.398 ***
(0.172) (0.167) (0.106) (0.134) (0.120)
Area of Residence 0.731 * 0.749 * 0.773 ° 0.776 °
(0.148) (0.145) (0.140) (0.140)
Current benefits 1.194 1.248
(0.169) (0.165)
Education 1.263 ° 1.232 ° 1.298 * 1.273 *
(0.119) (0.116) (0.114) (0.114)
Sex 0.675 *** 0.674 ** 0.636 *** 0.655 *** 0.652 ***
(0.110) (0.107) (0.106) (0.106) (0.106)






HH income (imputed) 0.981
(0.117)
Imputation dummy 1.965 *
(0.263)
Constant 25.347 *** 24.177 *** 35.488 *** 28.515 *** 28.515 ***
(0.341) (0.332) (0.254) (0.233) (0.233)
Nagelkerke R
2 0.053 0.052 0.044 0.043 0.047
Hosmer/Lemeshow 0.210 0.001 0.128 0.000 0.005
-2 Log likelihood
N 3,717 3,960 4,048 4,062 4,048




Odds Ratios (Standard Errors in Parentheses)
2462.534 2653.636
Model 4 Model 2 Model 3
  
Table 13: Support for public downward transfers, regression results; PPAS 2003 
  38Binary Logit Models Predicting Support for Downward Transfers: PPAS 2003
Family Policy: Flexible Working Hours for Parents
Variable
Age 0.986 ** 0.987 ** 0.984 *** 0.983 ***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
Childlessness 0.458 *** 0.493 *** 0.448 *** 0.454 ***
(0.169) (0.163) (0.118) (0.132)
Area of Residence 0.751 * 0.750 * 0.783 °
(0.145) (0.142) (0.138)




Sex 0.677 *** 0.691 ** 0.665 *** 0.670 ***
(0.109) (0.106) (0.105) (0.105)






HH income (imputed) 0.893
(0.117)
Imputation dummy 1.724 *
(0.025)
Constant 32.308 *** 29.586 *** 35.488 *** 28.515 ***
(0.341) (0.330) (0.254) (0.233)
Nagelkerke R
2 0.045 0.045 0.038 0.036
Hosmer/Lemeshow 0.040 0.199 0.632 0.451
-2 Log likelihood
N 3,720 3,961 4,073 4,063
°p < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
2646.182 2700.457
Model 1
Odds Ratios (Standard Errors in Parentheses)
2494.150 2708.778
Model 4 Model 2 Model 3
 
 





  39Binary Logit Models Predicting Support for Downward Transfers: PPAS 2003
Family Policy: Drastically Lower Costs for Education
Variable
Age 0.995 0.994 0.990 **
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
Childlessness 0.679 ** 0.712 ** 0.846 ° 0.538 ***
(0.129) (0.123) (0.090) (0.096)
Area of Residence 0.605 *** 0.596 *** 0.603 ***
(0.105) (0.103) (0.100)
Current benefits 1.309 * 1.364 ** 1.475 ***
(0.117) (0.111) (0.094)
Education 0.755 ** 0.780 ** 0.789 **
(0.083) (0.080) (0.078)
Sex 0.843 * 0.886 0.868 ° 0.870 °
(0.078) (0.075) (0.074) (0.074)










Constant 7.735 *** 7.559 *** 4.777 *** 6.399 ***
(0.255) (0.243) (0.112) (0.163)
Nagelkerke R
2 0.038 0.036 0.034 0.020
Hosmer/Lemeshow 0.585 0.731 0.889 0.673
-2 Log likelihood
N 3,713 3,954 3,995 4,056
°p < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
4424.440 4561.952
Model 1
Odds Ratios (Standard Errors in Parentheses)
4074.188 4465.255
Model 4 Model 2 Model 3
 
Table 15: Support for public downward transfers, regression results; PPAS 2003 
  40Binary Logit Models Predicting Support for Downward Transfers: PPAS 2003
Family Policy: Better Housing for Families
Variable
Age 0.988 ** 0.989 ** 0.990 ** 0.991 **
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Childlessness 0.559 *** 0.573 *** 0.567 *** 0.612 ***
(0.132) (0.128) (0.092) (0.099)
Area of Residence 1.720 *** 1.751 *** 1.748 ***
(0.096) (0.093) (0.092)
Current benefits 0.983 0.979
(0.119) (0.114)
Education 0.786 ** 0.744 *** 0.739 **
(0.086) (0.082) (0.081)
Sex 0.793 ** 0.782 ** 0.787 ** 0.758 ***
(0.081) (0.078) (0.077) (0.076)




HH income 1.370 ***
(0.089)
HH income (imputed) 1.353 ** 1.332 **
(0.089) (0.083)
Imputation dummy 0.769 ° 0.806
(0.155) (0.152)
Constant 4.729 *** 4.547 *** 4.619 *** 6.907 ***
(0.255) (0.244) (0.190) (0.169)
Nagelkerke R
2 0.039 0.041 0.040 0.019
Hosmer/Lemeshow 0.070 0.404 0.199 0.367
-2 Log likelihood
N 3,720 3,962 4,049 4,063
°p < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
4178.107 4324.034
Model 1
Odds Ratios (Standard Errors in Parentheses)
3868.838 4245.557
Model 4 Model 2 Model 3
  
Table 16: Support for public downward transfers, regression results; PPAS 2003 
  41  
Binary Logit Models Predicting Support for Upward Transfers: PPAS 2003
Policy-Mix: Reforming the Pension System by Putting More Burden on the Young 
Variable
Age 1.009 * 1.011 * 1.010 ** 1.011 ** 1.012 **
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Childlessness 1.760 *** 1.653 *** 1.675 *** 1.599 *** 1.709 ***
(0.127) (0.122) (0.107) (0.119) (0.121)
Area of Residence 0.575 *** 0.571 *** 0.562 *** 0.564 ***
(0.118) (0.115) (0.111) (0.112)
Education 0.946 0.944
(0.105) (0.101)
Sex 0.919 0.880 0.863 0.855 °
(0.097) (0.094) (0.093) (0.093)
Marital Status 0.985 0.975 0.936 0.965





HH income (imputed) 1.041
(0.106)
Imputation dummy 1.057 °
(0.192)
Constant 0.218 *** 0.222 *** 0.138 *** 0.210 ***
(0.250) (0.239) (0.204) (0.219)
Nagelkerke R
2 0.025 0.024 0.023 0.012 0.024
Hosmer/Lemeshow 0.656 0.537 0.742 0.265 0.751
-2 Log likelihood
N 2,736 2,905 2,950 2,943 2,943




Odds Ratios (Standard Errors in Parentheses)
2782.566 3039.899
Model 4 Model 2 Model 3
 
Table 17: Support for public upward transfers, regression results; PPAS 2003 
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